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SURVEY SECTION
Consumer Protection. Schram v. Burrillville Chevrolet, Inc.,
728 A.2d 457 (R.I. 1999). Under the Rhode Island Lemon Law, les-
sees of an allegedly defective motor vehicle may institute a cause of
action against both the manufacturer of the vehicle and the manu-
facturer's authorized dealership. In addition, lessees may return
the vehicle to the dealership, as returning the vehicle to the manu-
facturer will often be impracticable.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On May 9, 1996, plaintiffs Alice A. Schram and James M.
Schram (the Schrams) leased a new 1996 Chevrolet Blazer from
defendant dealership, Burrillville Chevrolet, Inc. (the dealership).'
The dealership was an authorized representative of the vehicle's
manufacturer, General Motors Corporation. 2 Due to excessive oil
consumption, the Schrams brought the vehicle back to dealership
for repairs on at least four occasions. 3 Claiming that the dealer-
ship failed to solve the vehicle's oil problem, the Schrams filed a
complaint against the dealership and General Motors Corp., based
on the Rhode Island Lemon Law4 and the Deceptive Trade Prac-
tices Act.5
The dealership filed a motion to dismiss the Schram's com-
plaint, arguing that the dealership's duty under both statutory
provisions was limited to the making of repairs, while full liability
rested with the manufacturer. 6 The superior court granted the
dealership's motion.7 The Schrams appealed, arguing that the rul-
ing, by forcing them to return the vehicle to General Motors in De-
troit, Michigan, would severely undercut one of the main purposes
of the Lemon Law, "namely, to provide an expeditious and reason-
able remedy to consumers."8 They then amended their complaint,
alleging that both the dealership and General Motors violated the
Lemon Law and the Deceptive Trade Practices Act "by failing to
repair the SUV in conformity to the warranties, by refusing to ac-
cept the return of their SUV, and by failing to refund the trade-in
1. See Schram v. Burrillville Chevrolet, Inc., 728 A.2d 457, 458 (R.I. 1999).
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 31-5.2-2, -3, and -5 (1956) (1994 Reenactment).
5. R.I. Gen. Laws § 6-13.1 (1956) (1992 Reenactment).
6. See Schram, 728 A.2d at 458-59.
7. See id. at 459.
8. Id.
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allowance and other expenses they incurred during the term of the
lease."9
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Rhode Island Supreme Court resolved the dispute by as-
certaining the intent of the legislature. The court made note that
although it typically construes a statute by examining the lan-
guage, nature and object of the statute, it will not construe a stat-
ute literally if the underlying purpose of the statute is thereby
defeated or an absurd result is reached. 10
The court then cited two relevant provisions of the Lemon
Law. Section 31-5.2-2 of the Rhode Island General Laws states
that "[ilf a vehicle does not conform to any applicable express or
implied warranties. .. and the consumer or lessee reports the non-
conformity to the manufacturer of the vehicle, its agent, or its au-
thorized dealer ... [they] shall effect such repairs as necessary to
conform the vehicle to the warranty."" Section 31-5.2-3 of the
Rhode Island General Laws states that "[ilf the manufacturer, its
agent, or its authorized dealer or lessor does not conform the motor
vehicle to any applicable express or implied warranty.., the man-
ufacturer shall accept return of the vehicle," and refund the full
contract price or lease price, with some adjustments for trade-ins
and usage.12
Based on these two provisions of the Lemon Law, the dealer-
ship argued that while it had an obligation to make the necessary
repairs, which it claimed to have fulfilled, any liability for noncon-
formance is imposed on the manufacturer. 13 However, the Rhode
Island Supreme Court disagreed with the dealership's reading of
the statutes.
The court found that construing the language to require the
consumer to return a nonconforming vehicle solely at its place of
business and not to an authorized dealership located in this state
"would violate the Legislature's intent and effectuate an absurd re-
sult."' 4 The court noted that in the case of imported vehicles, "con-
9. Id.
10. See id.
11. Id. (quoting R.I. Gen. Laws § 31-5.2-2 (1956) (1994 Reenactment)).
12. Id. (quoting R.I. Gen. Laws § 31-5.2-3 (1956) (1994 Reenactment)).
13. See id. at 460.
14. Id.
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sumers might have to return the vehicle to Japan, Germany, or
even Yugoslavia.... " 15 Though the dealership may not be liable
for refunding or replacing a nonconforming vehicle, it can still act
as a conduit or agent for the manufacturer. 16 This interpretation
does not violate the language of the statute, which imposes liability
solely on the manufacturer.' 7 "Moreover, if the dealer could have
and should have cured the nonconforming vehicle by properly per-
forming repairs to it, then the dealer may be liable in any event for
failing to fulfill its legal obligations under the Lemon Law." i8
Therefore, it was error for the trial court to dismiss the dealer-
ship from any lawsuit based on the Lemon Law on the grounds
that it cannot find the dealer liable for refunding the purchase
price or replacing the nonconforming vehicle.19 In a typical situa-
tion, the dealer will be a necessary party to any relief that these
laws may afford. 20
CONCLUSION
In Schram v. Burrillville Chevrolet, Inc., the Rhode Island
Supreme Court held that the lessee of a defective motor vehicle
could return such a vehicle to the dealership where it was leased
and serviced as an agent of the manufacturer under the Lemon
Law. As far as consumers are concerned, the dealership, as the
agent of the manufacturer, acts as the manufacturer for purposes
of securing the manufacturer's compliance with the Lemon Law.
Russell P. Marsella
15. Id.
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. Id.
19. See id.
20. See id. at 461.
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